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P It E F ACE 
At a regularly scheduled meeting of the Aeronautics and Space Engineer-
ing Board (ASEB) of the National Research Council in April 1979, a 
proposed 10-year program of research and technology development in 
liquid rocket propulsion that had been prepared by the Office of Aero-
nautics and Space Technology, National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA) was described. The plan for such a program resulted 
from concern about the prospective availability of the technology and 
the industrial capability to develop and produce the advanced liquid 
rocket propulsion systems that are seen as being required for future 
space missions. The ASEB was askea by NASA to comment on the proposed 
program. NASA was concerned about the focus of its proposed program 
and whether it is important or necessary to support an acceptable 
'liquid rocket capability in industry for future space mission needs. 
At its meeting the ASEB observed that before any conclusions could 
be drawn more information and study would be needed regarding NASA's 
present program and its future plans. Therefore, to accomplish the 
requested review, the ASEB set up an ad hoc Committee on Liquid Rocket 
Propulsion and charged it with several tasks--specifically to: 
o Examine and assess the appropriateness, adequacy, and timing of 
NASA's planned research and technology development program for 
liquid rocket motors and vehicles that are foreseen as being 
required for the U.S. space program over the next few decades, and 
() Provide recommendations on the objectives, approach, and content 
of the plan. 
The committee met at the National Academy of Sciences in Washing-
ton, D.C., on March 25-26, April 29-30, and May 14-15, 1980. Repre-
sentatives from NASA, Rocketdyne, Aerojet, and Pratt & Whitney were 
called in when needed to provide information and answer questions, but 
were not present during discussions relating to the conclusions and 
recommendntions in this report. 
The committee did not examine or evaluate any of the programs for 
th(:~ development of the small non-cryogenic liquid engines used for 
gu:i.dance and orbital maneuvering because the development of such 
engines is well in hand and the industrial capability in this area is 
likely to be maintained in the foreseeable future. 
vii 
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SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The committee has reviewed NASA's proposed 10-year program of research 
and technology development for liquid rocket propulsion systems and 
concludes that the emphasis of the proposed program should be shifted 
to the continued growth of the space shuttle. Technology development 
for new major space systems should be deferred. 
In the committee's judgment the space shuttle and advanced versions 
of it will provide the principal space transport for the United States 
for the next 20 to 30 years, and the continued development of the 
shuttle main engine system to a.chieve design performance and life is 
the highest priority task in NASA's rocket engine program. 
Continued growth of the shuttle capability may entail further 
thrust increases in the main engine. Emphasis should be placed on 
establishing the technology for upgrading the main engine to its maxi-
mum possible thrust level, together with assuring its long reusable 
life. 
, To gain the full use of the shuttle, a versatile upper stage will 
be needed for the rapid t·ransfer of heavy payloads (10,000 to 12,000 
pounds) into synchronous orbit. Low acceleration transfer of large 
flexible systems from assembly in low earth orbit to their oprational 
altitudes must- be included. Such requirements are best met with a LOX-
hydrogen liquid-fueled engine with start-stop capability. The most 
economical and most practical engine for application in the needed 
thrust range of 1,000 to 20,000 pounds is a modified RL-IO. 
To provide for the longer term future needs, ~ liquid rocket pro-
pulsion technology program should be sustained in three general areas: 
Orbital Transfer Vehicles-'-a probable future need is the low 
acceleration of large space structures from near earth orbit to 
geosynchronous orbit. For this application, a technology program 
leading to a low thrust long burn-time engine should be supported. 
Earth--t:o-Orbit--whereas the liquid oxygen--hydrogen large thrust 
engines are receiving attention, there is utility in conducting 
studies of recoverable, reusable, long-life liquid oxygen-
hydrocarbon engines. 
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Planetary Missions--present plans call for development of both 
pressure-fed and high pressure pump-fed fluorine engines for retro-
propulsion. The committee has strong reservation regarding the use 
of liquid fluorine and recommends that the fluorine pump-fed engine 
not be pursued. The committee recommends a study of alternate 
pump-fed propellants. 
It is essential to sustain a continuing program of fundamental 
research directed to current and advanced liquid propulsion rocket 
systems of the future. Such a program should constitute a significant 
portion of the research and technology development effort and include 
work on rocket combustion, heat transfer, materials, propellants, 
lubricants, and seals. Conceptual approaches to problems that can lead 
to new and innovative solutions should be made whenever possible. 
Research efforts directed to new major space systems--e.g. a space 
satelli te power system, and the single-s tage-to-orbi t vehicle--should 
be limited to studies of economic and technical feasibility. 
The committee has reviewed the military needs for liquid rocket 
propulsion over the next decade. In general, military needs for large 
rockets are most readily met with solid rockets. On the other hand, 
small thrust liquid rockets for control purposes are needed in military 
space craft and strategic military vehicles. Current technology and 
system developments provide for such needs, and there is an adequate 
industrial base for their supply. 
Prompt implementation of the recommended program can productively 
sustain two contractor& in the liquid booster rocket field, although 
their capabilities will not be directly competitive. Furthermore, the 
recommended program will not retain the engineering and production 
personnel and facilities needed to provide two competitive companies. 
The committee does not propose or recommend the artificial maintenance 
of a contractor in the absence of a real and supportible need for the 
output of such a contractor. 
The importance the committee assigns to the success of the space 
shuttle prograin, its growth to the planned full operational capability, 
and the development of an orbital transfer vehicle cannot be over-
stated. This conviction is so strongly held that the committee's prin-
cipal recommendations concern liquid rocket engine work that should be 
given high priority to assure the success of the space shuttle. 
Specifically, the committee recommends: 
o Establishing a continuing program of improvement for the space 
shuttle main engine (SSME) beyond its initial operating capa-
bility. 
o Establishing the technology base of the SSME to provide the 
baseline for upgrading its maximum thrust level and reusable 
life. 
o A prequalification program for a modified RL-IO lIB engine 
(1,000-20,000 lbs thrust) as a versatile upper stage for both 
rapid and low-acceleration transfer of large flexible systems. 
2 
o A longer range program directed to providing the technology for 
a low thrust engine (200-2,000 pounds) of long durability in 
order to acquire a capability for orbital transfer. 
o A strong program of fundamental research in areas such as com-
bustion, heat transfer, materials, propellants, lubricants, and 
seals. 
o TradE~-off studies between LOX/H2 and LOX/hydrocarbon engines 
for earth-to-orbit missions. 
o Studies of propellants other than fluorine for pump-fed systems 
to further missions to planets in the solar system. 
o Review of the entire roeket propulsion field in about five 
years to update the conclusions of this committee. The next 
five years will presumably witness an important phase of matur-
ation for the space shuttle and a better definition of geosynch-
ronous payload requirements. 
3 
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I N T ROD U C T ION 
In the past two decades mank.ind has benefited from the use of space 
systems for communications, weather forecasting, terrestrial resource 
data acquisition, navigation, and scientific discoveries and under-
standing of the planet Earth and the solar system. In addition, space 
operations have become an important element of military defense. As 
the cost of placing payloads into orbit is brought down sharply, more 
space-based systems and networks may be expected. It is reasonable to 
conclude that just as the early launch vehicles stimulated today's uses 
of space systems, the shuttle and its upper stages will stimulate a 
great increase in the use of space. 
Much of the outreach into space has resulted from the development 
of liquid rocket propulsion capability in the United States, which 
includes all phases of research, development, production, and field 
operations for fully supporting the high state of readiness in military 
ballistic missiles and space capabilities and the extraordinary civil-
ian space activities. Some projections have indicated a need for 
advanced liquid rocket propulsion systems in the 1990's. For example, 
a technical committee of the American Institute for Aeronautics and 
Astronautics ·has stated that rapidly evolving space concepts and 
technologies will need advanced propulsion systems~ citing an up-rated 
shuttle with recoverable, reusable, higher-energy liquid rocket 
boosters to replace the present solid rocket boosters, and a reusable 
orbital transfer stage to be used from the shuttle.* 
As a result of a recommendation of its Research and Technology 
Advisory Council in May 1978, NASA undertook a study to gain a better 
understanding of liquid rocket propulsion needs and possible technical 
advances. 
In 1979 the House of RepresEmtatives Committee on Science and Tech-
nology expressed concern ••• 
* Space Transportation Systems 1980-2000, 
Series, Volume· 1. American Institute 
Astronautics. New York, N.Y. 1978. 
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Aerospace Assessments 
of Aeronautics and 
"with the declining industrial base for advanced chemical 
propulsion technology. In recent years the liquid rocket 
industry sales have become increasingly dominated by one engine 
development program because of limited new programs in the 
field. If our Nation is to be in a position to embark on 
future space initiatives, the government must make a deliberate 
determination as to the level and composition of the sustained 
industrial propulsion capability. To determine what national 
propulsion industry capability should be maintained, NASA 
should propose to the Congress a plan for advanced propulsion 
technology base activities and assess what portion of the 
industrial base will be maintained by their action."** 
As a consequence, NASA has prepared a program of research and tech-
nology development to advance the technologies that would enable the 
United States to effectively and economically embark on new space 
initiatives in the future. The program plan proposed by NASA spans a 
10-year period at a total cost of approximately $200 million. 
The budget request for the U. S. National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) for fiscal year 1981 is $5.74 billion, of which 
33 percent, or $1.87 billion, is for the space shuttle. The FY 1981 
NASA budget for Space Research and Technology is $113 million, of which 
$19 million is planned for the proposed research and technology devel-
opment (R&T) for advanced liquid rocket propulsion systems discussed 
in this report. Funding for the proposed program would peak to $32.6 
million in FY 1984 and then taper off over the remainder of the 
decade. 
It was the task of this committee to examine specifically the 
liquid rocket propulsion technology needs to support anticipated future 
space vehicles and discern what if any special action needs to be taken 
to assure that an industrial base is sustained. 
** U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology, Report 
No. 96-52: Authorizing Appropriation to the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration. Washington. U. S. Government Printing 
Office. March 19, 1979. 
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MISSION MODEL 
The planning of missions and the development of launching vehicles have 
historically been closely interrE~lated and will continue to be over the 
years ahead. Missions will be determined largely by the vehicles 
available to launch them and, where there are clearcut'mission require-
ments that cannot be met with existing vehicles, new vehicle designs 
will be determined by the missions. 
This chapter describes: 
o Missions that are planned with the various combinations of read-
ily available liquid and solid rockets until the Space Shuttle 
becomes operational. 
o Missions that are planned using the Space Shuttle Space Trans-
portation System for the period 1981-1986. 
o Probable future missions. 
Until the Space Shuttle becomes operational, NASA and DOD will use 
available liquid and solid rockE~ts to launch a variety of scientific, 
communication, meteorological, and other satellites into low earth and 
geosynchronous, orbits. 
NASA plans to use Scout, Delta, and Atlas-based vehicles (Figure 
1) with lift-off thrusts of 95,000-1,000,000 lbs to place payloads of 
200-·'4,000 Ibs in low-earth and geosynchronous orbits. As of July 1980, 
the agency had 45 missions planned with such vehicles for the 1981-84 
period, 38 from the east coast (Kennedy Space Center) and 7 from the 
west: coast (Vandenburg Air Force Base). 
DOD plans to use a series of Atlas-based, and Titan-based vehicles 
(Figure 1) with lift-off thrusts of 430,000-2,400,000 lbs to launch 
payloads of 4,800-27,600 lbs in low-earth orbits and payloads of 2,400-
4,000 1bs in geosynchronous orbits. As of July 1980, DOD had 45 mis-
sions planned with such vehicles for the 1981·-85 period, 8 from the 
east coast and 37 from the west coast. 
When the Space Shuttle becomes operational, it will be the center-
piece of the nation's space actlv:tties, both clvi1 and military. With 
thrE~e liquid rocket engines that can each produce a thrust at sea level 
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NASA Vehicles 
Scout 
DOD (U.S. Air Force) Vehicles 
Titan IIiB 
Atlas-E/F 24B 34B 
SOURCE: NASA 
Delta 
3914 
Titan IIIC 
Atlas-
Centaur 
Titan IIID Titan 
34D/RGS 
FIGURE 1 NASA and DOD Pre-Shuttle Launch Vehicles (NASA, 1978) 
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Titan 
34D/IUS 
with a thrust of 2.7 million lbs each, the Space Shuttle would have a 
rated total thrust at lift-off of about 6.5 million lbs, enough to 
launch a 65,OOO-lb payload into low earth orbit (Figures 2 and 3). 
Solid Rocket Boosters 
(Jettisoned During Launch 
and Recovered) 
SOURCE: NASA 
External Tank (Jettisoned at End of Launch) 
Fuel for Main Engines 
Orbiter 
FIGURE 2 Spac:e Shuttle Vehlcle 
FIGURE 3 Recoverable Solid Rocket Booster Separation 
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Missions Planned for Space Shuttle, 1981-1986 
To take full advantage of the Space Shuttle's capability as a 
launch platform, a high efficiency liquid rocket upper-stage vehicle 
for the transfer of payloads from the Space Shuttle's low earth orbit 
to other and higher orbits will ultimate1ey be required. Some upper-
stage vehicles that can launch payloads into geosynchronous earth orbit 
(GEO) from the Space Shuttle are being readied. Plans are being made 
to carry two, three, and even four such vehicles on a single Shuttle 
flight, sometimes with low earth orbit (LEO) payloads aboard. In the 
meantime, studies are being made of the feasibility of using the RL-10* 
(the liquid rocket motor of the Centaur) for the development of an 
upper-stage vehicle that can utilize the full load-carrying capacity 
of the Space Shuttle for a GEO mission. For planetary missions, a 
vehicle is now being prepared from the current generation of solid 
rockets. 
The upper-stage vehicles currently planned for the Space Shuttle 
and the payloads they will be able to launch to GEO and on planetary 
missions are as follows: 
o The SSUS-D (Spinning Solid Upper Stage), a two-stage solid-rocket 
vehicle, will be able to place a 1,250-lb satellite in GEO. 
o The SSUS-A, a second two-stage solid-rocket vehicle, will be 
capable of placing a 2,200-lb satellite in GEO. 
o The IUS-2 (Inertial Upper Stage), a third two-stage solid-rocket 
vehicle, will be able to launch a 5,OOO-lb payload in GEO. 
o The IUS-3, a three-stage solid-rocket vehicle, will be capable 
of launching a 5,800-lb spacecraft on an interplanetary trajec-
tory.* 
The NASA and DOD missions that are planned with these vehicles are 
designated as the Space Transportation System (STS) series. Typical 
NASA payloads are listed in Table 1. For comparison an upper-stage 
vehicle based on the RL-IO could launch a l2,000-lb satellite in GEO. 
Probable Future Missions 
The questions of what are the probable future needs of both the 
military and civilian space programs are fundamental to making the 
judgments requested of this committee. 
*Subsequent to this review, on Jan. 15, 1981, NASA announced its inten-
tion to terminate its support of the stage inertial upper stage (IUS-3) 
for the shuttle to launch the Galileo orbiter and probe missions to 
Jupiter and to use a modified Centaur vehicle with its RL-lO engine 
instead, thus creating a need for some continued RL-lO production. 
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TABLE 1 Sampling of NASA Missions Scheduled for Space Transportation System Series 
During 1981-86 Period 
To be carried or launched by Space Shuttle in low earth orbit 
• NASA Office of Space and Terrestrial Application payload 
- Night/Day Optical Survey of Thunderstorm Lightning Experiment 
-_. Measuremeont of Air Pollution 
-- Ocean Color Experiment 
-- Feature Identification and Location Experiment 
• Payload Deployment and Retrieval System 
• NASA Office of Space Science payload 
- Various scientific experiments 
• Space Telescope (to be maintained in orbit by subsequent Space Shuttle flights) 
• Spacelab 
- Manned scientific laboratory with shirtsleeve working environment, built by European Space Agency 
• Long Duration Exposure Facility 
.- Various experiments requiring long-term exposure to space environment (to be retrieved by subsequent Space 
Shuttle flight) 
• Multi-Mission Modular Spacecraft 
-- Various instruments and observatories (to be serviced and retrieved during subsequent Space Shuttle flight) 
• Get Away Spl)cial Assemblies 
- Various small self-contained experiments provided by individual investigators (to remain on Space Shuttle during 
entire night) 
• LANDSAT 
-- Earth survey satellite incorporating Thematic Mapper and Multispectral Scanner (to replace LANDSAT now in 
orbit, latter to be retrieved and returned to earth) 
To be placed in geosynchronous earth orbit by IUS-2 launched from Space Shuttle while in low earth orbit 
• Four-satellite Tracking and Data Relay System for NASA use 
To be placed in geosynchronous and other earth orbits by SSUS-A and SSUS-D vehicles launched from Space Shuttle 
while in low earth orbit 
• Communication satellites in geosynchronous orbits 
• Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer Explorer in elliptical orbit 
• Geostationery Operational Environmental Satellite 
- Weather observation and early-storm-warning satellite 
To be placed on interplanetary trajectory by IUS-3* launched from Space Shuttle while in low earth orbit 
• Galileo Spacecraft 
- Instrumented vehicle to investigate Jupiter and its satellites 
• International Solar Polar Mission 
- Instrumented spacecraft to explore the sun and its environment 
----------------------------------------
*Subsequent to this review, on Jan. 15, 1981, NASA announced its intention to terminate its support of the IUS-3 for 
these missions and to use a modified Centaur vehicle with its RL-IO engine instead. 
Source: NASA (1980c). 
A great deal of careful work has been done 
the future needs of NASA. Parametric studies 
required to launch various weights of payloads 
geosynchronous orbit, and planetary orbit based 
forecast technology have been made. 
in trying to forecast 
defining the vehicles 
into low earth orbit, 
upon both current and 
The results of these studies for just the low earth orbit phase is 
conveniently pictured in Figure 4 taken from the February 1980 Status 
Report of the OAST Advanced Space Transportatin Working group. The 
lower boundary is a no-growth case and is the baseline capability of 
the Space Transportation System (shuttle). For this lower boundary, 
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Sattelite Power S vstem Scenario 
Shuttle Growth 
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102 198300---------1..-2000 2020 2040 
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SOURCE: NASA 
FIGURE 4 Space T ransportat' 10n T echnology Planning Scenarios 
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OrbHers, 099 and 103, are scheduled to enter service in December 1982 
and December 1983, respectively. 
It is anticipated that by reducing structural weight of the exter-
nal tank, the solid rocket booster· case s, and the orbiter and by 
increasing engine power through improvement in the engine that the 
desired capability of launching a payload of 65,000 pounds to LEO, 
which is required for certain key missions can be attained. 
From fiscal year 1981 to fiscal year 1990, a total of 380 flight 
missions are planned (see Table 2). Of these, 300 are to be Shuttle 
launched. 
TABLE 2 National Flight Requirements (DOD Rev 9 28 Mar 80 NASA Data) 
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY 
Launch Site 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
Eastern Space and Missile Center 
DOD -Titan 3 2 2 
- Medium Launch Vehicle 1 
- Space Transportation System (Shuttle) 1 4 3 6 8 5 9 10 12 
NASA - Medium Launch Vehicle 9 5 9 2 
- Space Transportation System (Shuttle) 2 6 13 15 19 28 29 30 28 
Western Space and Missile Center 
DOD -Titan 4 3 3 3 1 
- Medium Launch Vehicle 7 5 5 3 3 
- Space Transportation System (Shuttle) 3 4 6 6 8 9 
NASA- Medium Launch Vehicle 3 4 1 1 
- Space Transportation System (Shuttle) 3 6 6 8 7 6 
Combined - Titan 7 5 5 3 1 
- Medium Launch Vehicle 20 14 15 6 4 
- Space Transportation System (Shuttle) 3 10 16 27 37 45 52 55 55 
TOTAL 27 22 30 25 32 37 45 52 55 55 
*NASA data modified for Oct 84 Vandenberg AFB Initial Operational Capability. 
Source: USAF Space Division. 
The Space Shuttle is now considerably behind schedule. This is 
understandable for such a completely new type of flight vehicle with 
new and untried concepts. Furthermore, there is little precedent for 
expecting the shuttle to come from the first flight to sustain high 
frequency launching without having to overcome difficult, unforeseen 
problems. It may be expected, therefore, that need will occur for a 
greater use of expendable launch vehicles during the early to mid-
1980's. 
The committee feels that since the nation's future in space is so 
dependent on the success 'of the shuttle that greater effort should be 
taken to ensure the improved engine performance that is needed to 
accomplish presently planned missions. 
For the decade of the 1980' s, the mission model is now well 
defined. However, for full Shuttle utilization, an upper stage will 
be needed for the rapid transfer of heavy payloads (10,000 to 12,000 
po~nds) into synchronous orbit and for the low acceleration transfer 
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of large flexible systems from assembly in low earth orbit to their 
operational altitudes. 
The committee was briefed on studies of possible future missions 
involving Shuttle growth, heavy lift launch vehicles, and even single 
stage to orbit vehicles. Orbit transfer studies covered cargo vehi-
cles, possibly future manned vehicles, low thrust engines for special 
large space structures and possibilities for reusable orbital transfer 
vehicles. 
Based on all material available, and barring some new national 
program that would require a totally new vehicle such as, for example, 
the satellite power system, it is the committee's judgment that future 
missions can be accomplished by the planned growth in shuttle launch 
capability and an increased capability for the orbital transfer of 
cargo to synchronous orbit. It is clear that continued development is 
required for successful utilization of the Shuttle in the 1980 period 
and beyond. 
The importance which the committee assigns to the success of the 
Space Shuttle program, its growth to the planned full operational capa-
bility, and the development of an orbital transfer vehicle cannot be 
overstated. This conviction is so strongly held that the committee's 
principal recommendations concern a liquid rocket research and tech-
nology development program that should be given high priority to assure 
this success. 
14 
EARTH-TO-ORBIT VEHICLES 
Space Shuttle 
Since the start of the U.S. space program, the missions that have been 
carried out have been determined largely by the rocket motors availa-
ble. During the early part of the program, the motors developed for 
the Atlas and Titan missiles were the workhorses of NASA and DOD. 
Upgraded and modified, augmented at times with strap-on boosters, they 
have launched most of the large satellites and planetary probes that 
have been sent aloft by the United States. The only large rocket 
engines de!veloped specifically for a non-military mission were the 
precursors and final version of the 1.5 million-lb thrust Saturn F-l 
used for the Apollo man-on-the moon program and, subsequently, the 
Skylab program. 
The F-·l served its purpose well but for the future the cost of 
space activities must be reduced. 
The Space Shuttle was conceived and developed as the first step in 
reducing launch costs. ThE! reusable body, with its three 
oxygen/hydrogen main engines, and recoverable strap-on boosters are 
projected to significantly decrease the cost of operations. The 
initial saving will be limited by the loss of the main propellant tank 
on each flight, the cost of refurbishing the main engines, the cost of 
recovering and refurbishing the strap-on boosters, and the limited 
55-mission life of the reusable components, but further savings will 
be realized when fully reusable longer-lived components and subsystems 
are developed and the costs of servicing, maintenance, and inspection 
are redUCE!d. Both the civil and, military space programs depend on 
early qualification of the shuttle and its main engine and it is the 
committee's opinion that the Space Shuttle and growth versions of it 
will provide the principal space transport for the United States for 
the next 20 to 30 years and that the continued development of the 
shuttle main engine system to achieve design performance and. life is 
unquestionably the highest priority task in the NASA Rocket Engine 
program. 
As of July 1980, civil and military payloads were being prepared 
for 90 launchings of the Shuttle over the next 4-5 years, each of the 
fUghts carrying from 1 to 4 LEO, GEO, and planetary payloads. 
Technical difficulties have caused delays in the space shuttle main 
engine (SSME) development program. Flight certification of the engine 
at full power (109% rated power) has not yet been accomplished. 
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In assessing the technical difficulties that have been causing 
delays in the development and flight certification of the SSME at full 
power, it is important to understand that the engine is the most 
advanced liquid rocket motor ever attempted. Chamber pressures of more 
than 3,000 psi, pump pressures of 7,000-8,000 psi, and an operating 
life of 7.5 hours have not been approached in previous designs of large 
liquid rocket motors. These goals represent the creation of a high 
level of technology and a complex engine-vehicle flight system simul-
taneously. 
It is unfortunate that the practice usually followed in the devel-
opment of aircraft and rocket engines was sidestepped during the 
development of the ss~m in an effort to save time. The design of the 
engine system before completion of R&D programs on the pumps, turbines, 
controls, and other major components is largely responsible for the 
costly failures and delays in the program. 
Understandably, the primary focus of the Space Shuttle program is 
still on the problems that stand in the way of achieving an operational 
capability "lith the initial version of the Shuttle but the committee 
recommends a significantly broader program. The committee urges the 
parametric characterization of the main engine system and its compo-
nents in order to establish the technical foundation needed to make the 
fixes and improvements that will be required during the balance of the 
program. If this is not done, the billions of dollars being spent on 
the Shuttle will not benefit the rest of this program and future 
projects. 
It is also urgent that a program be established as soon as possible 
for the testing of all the flight-type hardware over the operating 
range. There is no other rational way of evaluating failures or esti-
mating the success of an improved or new design. Such tests should be 
fully instrumented to measure and record all the gross and detailed 
data required for a full analysis and understanding of the operating 
characteristics of the SSME and its components. 
Also required at the present time is a clear statement of the 
program contemplated for the development of the SSME during the 1982-85 
period and beyond. NASA's goal is the achievement of full power oper-
ation by 1982 and an operating life of 7.5 hours (55 starts) during 
1982-85 but the level of funding and methods to be used to reach these 
goals do not appear to have been worked out. If, as NASA indicates, 
the first 300 missions will be accomplished with four Space Shuttle 
vehicles, a rapid improvement in the operating life of the SSf.m is 
essential. The level of funding will be critical. Experience has 
shown that the funds required after qualification of an engine usually 
exceed those spent in reaching it. The committee believes that it is 
time for NASA to develop a program for the continued development of the 
SSME beyond 1982. In recognition of the importance of the Space Shut-
tle to the future of space activities by the United States, the com-
mittee concludes as follows: 
1. The continued development of space shuttle main engine is the 
highest priority task of the NASA liquid rocket program. 
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2. NASA should initiate a test program to measure the characteris-
tics of the principal SSME components over a wide range of 
operating variables. 
3. A program should be initiated to recover technological data 
created in the SSME program which has up until now not been 
adequately reported. 
4. Planning and budgeting for SSME continued development after 1982 
should be initiated, including consideration of methods for 
upgrading the shuttle performance. 
Projected Vehicle Needs 
The Mission Models data presented by NASA were reviewed to deter-
mine the basis for new Earth-to-Orbit (ETO) vehicles having capabili-
ties beyond the Shuttle and its generic enhancements. Of special 
interest was whether the information is "convincing" on: 
1. The realism of the advanced missions and time scales 
2. The value (performance gains and cost effectiveness) of proposed 
new vehicle configurations. 
Such information was used to provide a framework for assessing the 
importance and prioritization of the various technology program ele-
ments presented, and the realistic dates by which such "enabling" 
technology to support propulsion system development programs for each 
new vehicle would be needed. 
The information presented indicates: 
1. For slow growth in the demand for annual payload weight deliv-
ered to low-earth orbit (up to about 5%), enhancements to the 
Shuttle capabilities currently envisioned would probably 
suffice. 
2. For larger growth in orbit weight per year (up to about 10%), 
development of new vehicles based in part on Shuttle technology 
may be cost effective. 
3. For new mission concepts requ1r1ng very large weights per year, 
new, very heavy launch vehicles would be necessary. 
Considerations of the reality and time schedule of the third cate-
gory of mIssions (e.g. SatellIte Power System) and, therefore, of the 
need for a very large launch vehIcle (Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle, HLLV) 
do not justify any significant technology development effort in the 
foreseeable future. However, any effort that would provide the basic 
eng:lneering data and design criteria for the engines and propulsion 
system of the proposed nearer-term enhancement of the shuttle and 
possible derivative vehicles would be directly useful for any future 
very large heavy-lift launch vehieles. 
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A follow-on of the Space Shuttle might be an intermediate-lift 
launch vehicle that is capable of launching LEO payloads of up to a few 
hundred thousand pounds and commensurate GEO and planetary payloads. 
As a basis for its research and technology development program, NASA 
envisions a L02/hydrocarbon motor with a lift-off thrust of 500,000-
600,000 lbs that could be clustered to provide the first stage of such 
a vehicle and the use of a cluster of the L02/LH2 SSMEs to power 
the second stage. Other options are being studied, including the 
development of a motor with two stages of operation that, clustered, 
could power a single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicle. 
Single-Stage-to-Orbit Vehicles 
A chart presented by NASA and reproduced in Figure 5 depicts the 
cost of payload into low earth orbit in $/Kg versus operational date. 
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A list of advantages for s:Lngle-stage-to-orbit vehicles was pre-
sented. Some of the most import.3.nt from a cost point of view are: 
o No expendable hardware 
o Simplified logistics 
o Reduced ground turnaround operations 
o Single vehicle and engine development 
Such a veh:l.cle would be sophisticated far beyond the existing Shuttle. 
Sinee it must carryall of the inert mass of the hardware associated 
with the propellants required for producing a velocity of Z9,000 ft/sec 
all the way to orbit, the sensitivity to structural design, thermal 
protection" protection systems, engine performance, etc., makes the 
val:i.dity of assumptions and the quality of design data very important. 
The engines required for a Single-Stage-to-Orbit vehicle could 
operate entirely on LOX + HZ, or a sequence of LOX + RP-l or LOX + 
CH4 and then LOX + HZ. NASA has proposed the need to develop 
technology for a dual-fueled engine for Single-Stage-to-Orbit vehicles. 
This proposal is based on vehicle performance analysis which indicates 
advantages of higher mass fraction (propellant density) for the first 
part of the trajectory (high drag - low acceleration portion) and then 
a switch to a propellant with a higher specific impulse after a certain 
acceleration ( AV) has been achieved. For any given set of propul-
sion parameters there would certainly be such an optimum mix of pro-
pellants; providing the specific impulse of the high density 'fuels is 
not too low. The data presented in Figure 6 indicates that dual-fueled 
engines compared with a LOX + HZ system have a potential for a ZO% 
lower cost. However, a parallel-burn dual engine-configuration pro-
vides essentially the same overall projected eost saving without the 
dual-fuel complexity. 
Therefore, the requirement for a dual-fueled engine development is 
open to question. 
It should be noted that data presented to the committee showed 
LOX + RP-l engines .for Single--Stage-to-Orbit targeted to operate at 
4000 psi chamber pressure in order to support the performance 
estimates. This is most doubtful for fuels such as RP-l. It may be 
achievable with CH4. 
Discussion with NASA propulsion experts indicates that the engine 
and propulsion system design and performance assumptions used for some 
of the new vehicle system analysis may not have had the necessary 
expert opi.ni.on and evaluation needed to assure a consistent basis for 
comparison of performance potential and development costs among the 
various options. It is the opinion of the committee that the cost 
reduc tions to be made by technology growth, illustrated in Figure 5 
appear highly qualitative and assertive. An on-going, in-depth review 
of such studies by a broad spectrum of NASA engineering specialists 
would seem warranted. Critical evaluation is necessary before any work 
related to such vehicles is undertaken. 
It is the concensus of the committee members that any extensive 
technology work related to "Du.al-Fueled Engines" is premature and is 
not recommended. To do useful work on this concept requires complex 
and fairly large combustion chambers and breadboard engines to provide 
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any real credibility. This will be very expensive if any timely 
progress is to be made and should await a much more definitive need. 
After examining the studies NASA has made, the committee does not 
find that a convincing case has been made for any of the Single-Stage-
to-Orbit options considered. 
Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicles 
To launch LEO payloads of up to 1 million lbs (and commensurate GEO 
and planetary payloads), NASA envisages the development of a 2-million-
lb thrust liquid-fueled motor that can be clustered to produce the 
lift-off thrust required for the first stage of such a vehicle (see 
Figure 7). The second stage could be a cluster of Space Shuttle main 
engines (SSMEs), or a cluster of the motors developed for the first 
stage of an intermediate-lift launch vehicle. Heavy lift launch 
vehicles (HLLVs) could be designed so that all or only parts of the 
vehicle are recoverable and reusable. 
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In nearly every configuration considered, NASA has indicated the 
desirability of a L02/hydrocarbon first stage and L02/LH2 second 
stage. The use of L02/LH2 for both stages would result in larger 
(but lighter) vehicles and, according to NASA estimates, a SO percent 
increase in operating costs. When a comparison is made of the vehicle 
plus propellant costs for a IS-year program involving LEO payloads 
totaling 125,000 metric tons/yr. however, the cost differences become 
narrower and, at higher staging velocities, become ambiguous (Figure 
8). NASA should more firmly ascertain the advantages of a 
L02/hydrocarbon motor over a L02/LH2 motor for the reusable 
first stage of a HLLV. 
Reliability, simplicity, and environmental effects should be considered 
along with development and recurring costs before an extensive R&D 
program is started. L02/LH2 may prove to be the best choice for 
all future propulsion systems. 
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If a careful study of all the factors involved does indeed support 
the case for a L02/hydrocarbon motor, the next question to be 
resolved is whether the hydrocarbon should be RP-I or CH4. The 
optimum operating conditions could be different with each, leading to 
different technological problems. Comparisons of propellant systems 
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must take into account any limitations that might be placed on the 
operating range of the motor by coking, pump cavitation, the heat 
transfer characteristics of the propellants, etc. Where the limita-
tions are not already known, preliminary investigative work may b~ 
needed to enable the selection of the propellant system with the 
greatest potential. 
Integrated Orbit Maneuvering and Reaction Control System 
Another need for propulsion included under the Earth-to-Orbit 
Technology Plan relates to advanced auxiliary propulsion systems: the 
Orbit Maneuvering and Reactions Control systems of the Shuttle. The 
LOX'··Hydrocarbon fuels are also attractive for this class of propulsion 
system as a replacement for the nitrogen tetroxide-monomethylhydrazine 
propellants currently used in the shuttle. Oxygen-Hydrocarbon fuel 
offers higher performance. and would circumvent potential environmental 
and safety issues related to the production of monomethylhydrazine and 
avo:l.d its increasing cost. 
The program as described calls for conducting all of the system 
studies and analysis needed to select the "best" propellant combination 
and operat:lng conditions. The detailed component and breadboard tech-
nology program would then be defined. 
The system studies to be carried out first should select both the 
propellant combination (02 + CH4 or 02 + C3HS or 02 + NH3 or 02 + RP) 
and the operating conditions and system design. The technology work 
would then be undertaken on the selected propellants to verify combus-
tion performance, oxidizer and fuel handling and insulation, carbon 
formation, heat transfer, etc. The final phase of the program would 
be a breadboard integrated system evaluation. This appears to be a 
good program which will provide data of interest to systems beyond the 
Shuttle's orbiting maneuvering system and reaction control system. 
Technology Needs and Conclusions 
One objective of the proposed earth-to-orbit vehicle technology 
program is to develop analytical techniques, and develop design models 
and design procedures for launch vehicle engines and propulsion 
systems. One product would be a set of computerized models that could 
simulate c.omponent and system performance. These models and data 
would be important to aid in determining vehicle performance and in 
making propellant selections. Much of the input data for LOX and 
hydrocarbons are known from past experience. This experience has been 
summarized in the many "Design Criteria" documents that NASA has 
assembled and published during the past 10 years. By relating this 
available engineering criteria to the selected, advanced propulsion 
system requirements, gaps in the criteria at needed extensions can be 
identified. Any technology programs related to LOX + Hydrocarbons 
should then be defined to determine these basic and generic design 
criteria to fill the gaps. This type of fundamental technical data 
will be applicable to almost any new LOX + Hydrocarbon rocket propul-
sion engine design at any scale. 
The results of NASA's "Fundamental Discipline Research" will extend 
the generic design criteria data base for hydrocarbon propellants to 
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ranges of most interest for possible future booster vehicles. In the 
schematic outline of Liquid Rocket Propulsion System Evolution (see 
Figure 9), such work is a logical starting point. With this type of 
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data to provide basic operating limits and the propulsion system models 
discussed earlier, the combination having the most potential for major 
performance improvement and lowest net amortized cost for advanced 
missions could be selected. Any future Technology Development Phase 
should be undertaken with only the selected system and engine cycle 
concept. The important issues to resolve early are: 
o The highest performance potential engine cycle for both LOX + 
RP-I and LOX + CH4 
--Gas Generator Cycle 
--Staged Combustion Cycle 
o The most cost effective and technically feasible operating pres-
sure for each propellant combination (probably very different 
for RP-I and CH4) 
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o The maximum turbine inlet temperatures achievable with con-
trolled gas properties 
o The optimization of regc~nerative cooling regimes for maximum 
future engine cycle life. 
This information along with already known criteria 
to permit selection of propellants between RP-l 
resolve the comparative performance between LOX 
hydrocarbons. 
will serve not only 
and CH4, but also 
+ H2 and the two 
Most of the remaining technology work described by OAST (see Figure 
10) would be generically useful for designing any advanced engine cycle 
at any scale, e.g.: 
o Turbomachinery Dynamics 
o High-Temperature Turbine Cooling 
o Long-Life Bearings and Seals 
o Combustion Characteristics at Off-Mixture Ratio Conditions 
o Maintainability 
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ORBITAL TRANSFER VEHICLES 
According to present planning, the full potential of the Space Shuttle 
for launching payloads to geosynchronous or other high orbit and escape 
payloads, will not be realized until a new upper-stage vehicle is 
developed in the late 1980s. In the meantime, NASA will use four 
available solid rockets with the Shuttle for launches to geosynchronous 
earth orbit (GEO) and planetary launches: two Spin-stabilized Upper 
Stages (the SSUS-D and the SSUS--A, capable of launching GEO payloads 
of 1,250 and 2,200 lbs) and two Inertial Upper Stages (the IUS-2, capa-
ble of launching GEO payloads of 5,000 lbs, and the IUS-3, capable of 
launching a 5,800 lb spacecraft on an interplanetary trajectory) as 
described in the section on MISSION MODELS. 
Despite the relative simplicity and reliability of the solid rocket 
vehicles, there are no plans for developing larger ones for upper-stage 
vehicles. Liquid rockets have better performance characteristics and 
their start-stop capability makes them more versatile. 
It is anticipated that new orbital transfer vehicles will be needed 
by the late 1980's or early 1990's for two types of missions: 
o The rapid delivery and/or retrieval of manned and unmanned 
satellites. 
o The relatively slow transfer to geosynchronous orbit of large 
space structures that are first assembled or deployed in low 
earth orbit. 
NASA is using two concepts of orbital transfer vehicles as a basis 
for planning its research and technology development program. The 
first involves a dual-thrust liquid rocket motor that would operate at 
two different thrust levels, producing a high thrust for normal GEO 
payloads and a low thrust for low acceleration transfer of large struc-
tures. The other approach involves the development of two separate 
motors, one for each type of mission. 
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Dual-Thrust 
The objective of NASA's dual-thrust orbital transfer vehicle pro-
pulsion program is the development of a L02/LH2 motor that will 
produce thrusts of 15,000 lbs and 1,500 lbs. The agency plans to carry 
two somewhat different designs to the breadboard stage before deciding 
which to use. One is a new dual thrust engine based on the expander 
cycle similar to the RL-lO, the motor developed for the Centaur. The 
other, builds on technology developed in the advanced high thrust 
(20,000 lbs., L02/LH2) engine technology program for a future new 
engine with appropriate modifications to permit operation at thrust 
levels as low as 2,000 Ibs. The status of the advanced high thrust 
engine technology program is that many of the components have been 
tested :i.ndividually and tests as a breadboard assembly have been 
proposed. 
Separate High-Thrust and Low-Thrust 
In this approach, NASA envisages a high-thrust vehicle with a 
thrust of 15,000 Ibs and a low--thrust vehicle that has a thrust of 100 
to 2,000 1 bs and a burn-time of as much as 40-50 hours. The high--
thrust vehicle would be the engine to develop from the advanced high 
thrust engine technology program mentioned above. The low-thrust: 
vehicle would necessitate a new development program. 
The technology base required for the design of a low-thrust long--
burn-time system is quite different from the technology base estab--
Ii shed for the systems developed to date. A number of unique problems 
are going to be met, particularly (a) the boiling of cryogenic propel-
lant in small feed lines at low flow rates, (b) the cooling of small 
combustors, and (c) the fabrication and efficient operation of small 
pumps and other small mechanical parts. If the boiling of liquid 
hydrogen proves to be too great a problem, it will be necessary to 
consider hydrocarbons as fuels. These problems are discussed more 
detail in the FUNDAMENTAL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM section of this report. 
Comparison of Concepts 
The two proposed programs represent a sound technical approach to 
achieving the cited goals. However, after comparison of the results 
of the systems analyses presented with the capabilities of the RL-lO, 
it is the corumi ttee' s conclusion that the pre-qualification of an 
upgraded model of the RL-IO should take priority over the proposed 
technology programs, especially over the dual thrust program. This 
upgrading of the RL-IO would achieve an increase in specific impulse 
(ISP), demonstrate longer life at both high and low thrust, and assess 
redundancy additions for improved reliability and man rating. The low 
thrust propulsion program seems to hold promise for vehicles for 
changing the orbits of large, flimsy space structures. The systems 
analyses referred to are the results of many studies, both within NASA 
and by contractors. The analyses addressed two separate points: 
1. What are the payload. advantages of the advanced high pressure 
staged-combustion engine (ISP = 476 secs) mentioned above vs. 
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the basic RL-lO as it is today (ISP = 438 secs) or the improved 
RL-lO (ISP = 460 secs). Several mission scenarios were consid-
ered: 
a) Deploy the payload to geosynchronous (GEO) altitude and 
expend the stage; 
b) Deploy the payload to GEO and return the stage to low earth 
orbit (LEO) for recovery and re-use; and 
c) Deploy the payload to GEO and return the payload to LEO as 
required for a manned GEO mission. Table 3 is representa-
tive of the results for a 65,000 1b payload shuttle and one 
excursion to a 100,000 Ib payload shuttle. 
TABLE 3 Geosynchronous Payload Capabilities of lS,OOO-lb Thrust Orbital Transfer Vehicles 
Payload Payload Payload Payload and OTV 
Specific Delivered Delivered andOTV Returned with Aero-
Returned assisted Braking Engine Impulse (sec) OTV Expended OTV Returned 
--------------------------------~~---
Launch vehicle: Space Shuttle with 65,OOO·lb LEO payload capability 
RL-I0 
RL·I0 lIB 
Advanced high-
performance engine 
438 
460 
476-480 
15,200 
16,750 
17,630 
5,000 
6,600 
8,200 
Launch vehicle: Space Shuttle with lOO,OOO·lb LEO payload capability 
RL-I0 
RL-lO lIB 
Advanced high-
performance engine 
Source: NASA (l980b). 
438 
460 
476-480 
1,600 
2,100 
3,000 
5,000 
7,000 13,000 
9,000 15,000 
2. For the deli very of large space structures to GEO which have 
been pre-deployed at low earth orbit (LEO) to assure their in-
tegrity, what is the tradeoff between increasing the weight of 
the structure to withstand the relatively high accelerations 
developed using a high thrust (15,000-20,000 lb) engine vs. 
reducing the thrust to (200-2000 lb) and lightening the struc-
ture? A further refinement of this systems analysis assesses 
the gain in size of a large structure achieved by developing a 
new efficient low thrust engine (ISP = 450, T = 570-217 lb) vs. 
using the RL-lO in the pump idle mode (ISP = 433 sec, T= 1500 
lb) or the tank idle mode (ISP = 400, T = 192 lb). 
Referring to Table 3, it is seen that the gain in payload between 
the existing RL-lO and the advanced high thrust technology engine is 
quite small for the most probable near-term use of an OTV to deliver 
the payload to CEO and expend the OTV. Both provide substantial 
increases in payload over the IUS (5,000 1bs.) For the case of deliv-
ering the payload and recovering the OTV, some payoff of higher ISP is 
indicated. Finally, for the round-trip manned CEO mission, the 65,000 
lb shuttle simply cannot deliver sufficient payload (13,000 lbs payload 
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required for a manned mission) from a single shuttle launch. However, 
for an upgraded 100,000 lb payload shuttle and the use of aero-assist 
braking of the OTV, manned GEO missions become feasible. The gain in 
performance between the improved RL-10 and that calculated for an 
advanced high thrust engine for this mission is only about 15 percent 
(2000 lb). By comparing the last two columns it is clear that develop-
ment of aero-assist braking for recovery provides a large payoff. 
Referring to Table 4, a 40 percent larger pre-deployed structure 
area can be delivered to GEO from LEO by a dedicatd new low thrust 
engine compared to using the RL-lO in the tank-idle mode. In both 
cases, however, the structures are extremely large (300 ft x 600 ft) 
so that substantial capability is achieved using either engine. 
TABLE 4 Geosynchronous Space Structure Capabilities of Low-Thrust Orbital Transfer Vehicles 
Specific Burn Time Payload Payload 
Engine Impulse (sec) Thrust (lbs) (hrs) Weight (lbs) Area (sq ft) 
RL-lO in low-thrust 
(pump-idle) mode 433 1,500 8 12,874 117,800 
RL-IO in low-thrust 
(tank-idle) mode 400 192 80 11,775 174,000 
Advanced high-performance 
low-thrust engine 450 570-217 75 15,255 240,000 
Launch vehicle is early version of Space Shuttle with 65,000-lb LEO payload capability. Entire payload (space structure) 
carried on launch (not previously deployed or assembled in low earth orbit). Much larger space structures can be launched 
if they are first deployed or assembled in low earth orbit and the full payload capacity of the Space Shuttle is then used to 
launch an OTV with large propellant tanks. 
Source: NASA (1980b). 
Table 3 shows the payloads that can be lifted lnto geosynchronous 
orbit by a 15,000 lb thrust OTV (either a high-thrust OTV or a dual-
thrust OTV operating in the high-thrust mode). The table shows the 
sizes of the payloads when: 
o The OTV is based on the use of the present RL-lO, an advanced 
RL-lO (RL-10 lIB), or the advanced high-performance motor. 
o The launching vehicle is an early version of the Space Shuttle, 
capable of lifting 65,000 lbs into low earth orbit, or a later 
version of the Shuttle, capable of lifting 100,000 lbs into low 
earth orbit. 
o The OTV is expended (left in orbit) 
o The payload is delivered (left in orbit) and the OTV is 
returned. 
o Both the payload and OTV are returned by retrofiring the OTV. 
o Both the payload and OTV are returned by retrofiring and aero-
assisted braking using vehicles like those shown in Figure 11. 
Payload capabilities of this order (13,000-15,000 lbs) would 
enable manned GEO missions. 
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Table 4 and Figure 12 show the sizes and configurations of some large 
space structures that can be launched into geosynchronous orbit with an 
early version of the Space Shuttle (65,OOO-lb LEO capability) and the 
following OTVs: 
o An OTV with a RL-IO-based dual-thrust motor operating in a low-
thrust (1500 lb) mode. 
o An OTV with a RL-IO-based dual-thrust motor operating at a lower 
thrust (192 lb). 
o An OTV with an advanced high-performance single-thrust motor pro-
ducing a thrust in the 217-570 lb range. 
These calculations, provided by NASA, are based on an expendable (non-
returnable) OTV. It should be noted that a reduction in the thrust of the 
RL-IO-based OTV from 1500 lbs to 192 lbs makes it possible to lift a 
structure with a larger area into geosynchronous orbit since, with a lower 
acceleration, the structure can be less rigid. 
Although there are some advantages to separate high-thrust and low-
thrust motors of advanced design, the committee believes a major step in 
capability can be achieved by going to a L02/LH2 stage based on the 
existing RL-IO and an improved RL-IO II B. Top priority should be given to 
the modification of the RL-IO for a dual-thrust OTV since it is already 
available and has been operated with complete reliability during 10,000 
test firings (a total operating time of about 25,000 minutes) over a 
l500-2l,000-lb thrust range. 
The committee recommends that NASA immediately pursue a prequalifi-
cation program for the improved RL-IO lIB at both high and low thrust. A 
second priority would be to pursue the proposed low thrust engine program. 
This approach has the virtue of affording the option of significant increase 
in orbit transfer capability in the 1980's at minimum development cost as 
compared to the long, high cost development of new engines. 
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PLANETARY SPACECRAFT RETRO-PROPULSION SYSTEMS 
Planetary missions of the future will be governed by the capabilities 
of the retro-propulsion systems developed for this type of mission. 
New concepts that can reduce thE~ weight and improve the performance of 
planetary spacecraft will enable the launching of payloads that are 
increasingly large, sophisticated, and complex (orbiters, probes, and 
landers, as well as spacecraft that can return material samples to 
earth) • 
The retro-propulsion for NASA's recent Mars Viking Orbiter/Lander 
was provided by an earth-storable pressure-fed system using nitrogen 
tetroxide (N204) and monomethyldrazine (MMH). The propellant com-
bination accounted for 40 percent (3100 lbs) of the total weight of the 
orbiter/lander at launch, most of it being required for the· short 
bursts uSE~d for orbit trim and other orbital maneuvers. For more 
demanding missions, propellant weights for this type of system would 
be prohibitive. 
Two approaches to this problem are being studied. For the near 
term, NASA is considering a pressure fed fluorine/hydrazine system that 
can improv4~ the propulsion performance by 25-30 percent over the ni tro-
gen tetroxide/MMH system. For future spacecraft, the agency is con-
sidering lighter-weight pump-fed systems that will improve the perf or-
manee (system weight) by another 20-25 percent. Since all the propel-
lants required for retro-propulsion must be accelerated to escape 
velocity, every' improvement will have a highly leveraged effect on 
costs and/lOr payloads. 
Pressure-Fed Systems 
The performance and operat:tonal capability of a pressure-fed 
fluorine/hydrazine retro-propulsion system is being evaluated in a 
demonstration program that was begun by NASA in 1977, after several 
years of basic work on the technology of fluorinated oxidizer propul-
sion. 
Tests are being carried out under simulated space conditions of a 
complete near-flight-weight assl~mbly that includes a motor, propellant 
tanks, tank pressurization systems, and a propellant distribution 
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system. The motor is designed for a thrust of 800 lbs, a specific 
impulse of 370 sec, 50 start-stop cycles, and burn times of up to one 
hour. 
Pump-Fed Systems 
A demonstration program for pump-fed fluorine/hydrazine retro-
propulsion systems is not likely to be started until the pressure-fed 
f luorine/hydrazine system is further along. In the meantime, some 
basic preliminary work is being done on pump-fed systems using earth-
storable propellants. 
Assessment of Planetary Retro-Propulsion Program 
Experience with liquid fluorine systems has shown fluorine under 
pressure to be highly unpredictable and exceedingly destructive. While 
the NASA program has been carried out very carefully, the committee has 
grave reservations about the use of liquid fluorine as a propellant. 
particularly when it is to be used in a spacecraft carried on the Space 
Shuttle. The risk to the personnel on the Shuttle, to say nothing of 
the damage that could be done to highly expensive equipment, is sub-
stantial and, in the committee's view, it is unacceptable and unwar-
ranted. 
Liquid fluorine can ignite a variety of metals, and does so with 
increasing unpredictability as its pressure and dynamic activity are 
increased. Successful tests with one or two sets of hardware are no 
guarantee that tests with the next set will not end in disaster. And 
if, when a failure does occur, an attempt is made to correct the 
design, the very unpredictabili ty of liquid fluorine will make the 
determination of reliability a prohibitively expensive statistical 
process. 
The committee recommends extensive studies of other high-energy 
propellant combinations (e.g., 02/CH4, 02/C3Hg. 02/N2H4, 
and NF3/N2H4) and, at the same time, the development of small 
pumps that can provide weight-saving advantages over pressure~fed 
systems. A program directed to the development and demonstration of 
an optimal safe-propellant pump-fed system offers a number of advan-
tages: 
a) a higher probability of success 
b) a lower cost, and 
c) a more readily acceptable end-product. 
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FUNDAMENTAL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 
A broad fundamental technology base is required for the design and 
development of the vehicles that are going to carry the U. S. space 
program through the decades ahead. 
NASA's basic research program is being carried out in six areas: 
o Pumps and pump drives 
o Combustion 
o Heat transfer 
o Nozzle aerodynamics 
o Low-gravity cryogenic fluid management 
o Component and system life, reliability, and maintenance. 
The work being done in each of these areas, the deficiencies of the 
programs, and the problems being faced are described below. 
Pumps and Pump Drives 
The primary emphasis in this area is on cryogenic pumps for 10w-
thrust motors for orbital transfer. To date, studies have been carried 
out on siJ~ types of displacement pumps and six types of dynamic pumps 
(Aerojet, 1980; Rocketdyne, 1980). 
The studies show that positive displacement pumps are more effi-
cient over .their entire operating range than dynamic pumps for the 
pumping of liquid hydrogen, but their performance diminishes with time 
due to the wear of seals and bearings. The life and reliability of the 
dymlmic pumps are superior. 
Each of the dynamic types appears suitable for particular applica-
tions; centrifugal pumps have acceptable efficiencies at low heads and 
appear to be the most promising of all the pumps for liquid oxygen, the 
hybrid Tes1a/centrifuga1 pumps have advantages at high flow rates, and 
vane pumps appear useful for liquid hydrogen at some pressures and flow 
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rates. The efficiencies of pitot pumps make them useful at high flow 
rates but they require too many stages. 
Three basic types of drives have been considered for these pumps; 
gas turbines, positive-displacement drives, and electric motors. 
Axial-impulse gas turbines appear well-suited for all the dynamic 
pumps, and positive displacement drives are suitable for positive dis-
placement pumps. Electric motors are suitable for all the dynamic and 
displacement pumps if weight is not an important consideration. 
Reliability and life are important considerations in the selection 
of the type of pump drive to be used and its design. Bearings and 
seals must be carefully studied and evaluated. In the design of gas 
turbine drives, means for cooling the turbine blades need to be exam-
ined. 
Pump Bearings 
Nearly all the liquid-hydrogen pumps developed to date use rolling-
element bearings for the rotating parts (Winn et al., 1974). Lubrica-
tion is one of the most serious difficulties. The use of bearing 
retainers with good lubricating characteristics have resulted in bear-
ing lives of up to 20 hours or more for DN* values of 1.8 million but 
bearings that can operate at high speeds for relatively long periods 
of time are required. The new generation of pumps are being designed 
to operate at speeds above the limits of current experience (DN = 2.4 
million) • 
New innovative concepts are needed. One of the alternatives to 
ball bearings that has been under study is a fluid-film bearing that 
uses the cryogenic liquid being pumped as the lubricant, and operates 
either in the hydrostatic or hydrodynamic mode. The major problem that 
has been encountered with this type of bearing is the wear from the 
high-speed rub that occurs during lift-off and shutdown, and during 
rotor excursions caused by sudden shock and instability. 
In order to reduce the wear, and also the fatigue, in rolling-
element and journal bearings under. cryogenic conditions, studies and 
tests have been carried out on hybrid combinations of ball and hydro-
static journal bearings. 
Pump Seals 
Considerable progress has been made on the development of. pump 
seals that work effectively at extreme temperatures and speeds (Burcham 
and Roynton, 1977) but there is still an inadequate technology base for 
the design of small seals. 
The relatively low-flow high-head turbopumps being studied for 
staged-combustion-cycle engines call for seals that are outside the 
state of the art in several respects. They must not only be smaller 
than any developed so far, but must function effectively for 300 runs 
with 10 hours between overhauls, something that has not been required 
* DN is a parameter of bearing performance. D is the shaft diameter 
in millimeters and N is the shaft speed in rpm. 
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before. Preliminary designs of an oxygen turbopump indicate it will 
be necessary to operate at shaft speeds of up to 90,000 rpm to realize 
reasonable pump and turbine efficiencies and keep the weight of the 
unit down. The .shaft diameter for this turbopump would be approxi-
mately 20 mm, resulting in a rubb:i.ng velocity at the periphery of the 
seal of 183 m/sec at 90,000 rpm. This rubbing velocity is outside the 
technology base for conventional rubbing-contact seals. 
Hydrostatic and hydrodynamic fluid-film seals should make it pos-
sible to achieve the multiple starts and extended life required, since 
fluid films essentially eliminate rubbing contact while keeping the 
leakage rate down to an acceptable level. Burcham and Roynton have 
described the design and analysis of two alternative primary-seal con-
figurations (the spiral-groove seal and the Rayleigh step piston-ring 
seal) and have reported the experimental evaluation of these seals with 
gaseous nitrogen and liquid oxygen. Both configurations appear to work 
satisfactorily, as does a secondary piston-ring seal they describe. 
Combustion 
The main emphasis in this area is on (a) the combustion of hydro-
carbon fuels in rocket motors and preburners, (b) ways of preventing 
deposits in the cooling passages of combustors that are cooled by heavy 
hydrocarbon fuels, (c) combustion stability, (d) throttling, and (e) 
the ignition of low-thrust combustors. 
Com~ustion_of Hydrocarbon Fuels 
Tests have been carried out to (a) determine if and how hydrocarbon 
fuels can be burned stably under conditions that will yield high per-
formance, (b) assess the adequacy of a vaporization model for the pre-
.diction of performance, and (c) study the effect of combustion design 
vari.ables on performance (Aerojet, 1979a; Pavli, 1979). 
Pavli ran tests with three d:lfferent fuels (RP-l, JP-lO, and lique-
fied natural gas) and liquid oxygen at a combustion chamber pressure 
of 600 psia, varying the L02/fuel ratio, the length of the combustion 
chamber (8.5-22 inches), and the injector design. The tests were made 
wi th four types of injectors, each of which was reamed several times 
to vary the pressure drop. The results showed that (a) heavy hydrocar-
bons can be burned stably in state-of-the-art combustion system 
designs, (b) the vaporization model is adequate for the evaluation of 
density and viscosity effects on performance, and (c) for the higher-
density hydrocarbon fuels, the vaporization model is also useful for 
showing the effect design variables (e.g., combustor length and injec-
tor pressure drop) can have on performance. 
Current research is focused on combustion stability, throttling and 
ignition of low-thrust combustors. 
Deposits in Cooling Passages 
If a liquid hydrocarbon fuel is used to cool a combustor wall 
before it Is injected into the chamber and burned, deposits may collect 
on the hot side of the cooling passages as a result of fractionating 
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and coking. Such deposits would interfere with the cooling of the wall 
and might result in a weakening and failure of the metal. 
Studies are now being initiated to determine the conditions under 
which such deposits can form and how they might be avoided. 
Heat Transfer 
All of the work in this area is focused on problems associated with 
the cooling of combustion chambers. 
Life of Reusable Combustors 
To reduce the size and weight of rocket motors, operating pressures 
must be increased, but high chamber pressures impose severe cooling 
requirements, particularly at the nozzle throat. To meet the minimum 
life requirements for the reusable high-performance rockets that are 
being designed for the decades ahead, the combustor walls are being 
fabricated with relatively high-strength high-conductivity copper-base 
alloys. 
Improvements in operating life have been achieved by coating the 
inner surfaces of combustion chambers with thermal barriers (Quentmeyer 
et al., 1978), some of which are described below. Improvements in com-
bustor life have also been obtained by reducing the stiffness of the 
outer wall on the theory that failures are due to low-cycle thermal 
fatigue, although subsequent experimental work has led to the conclu-
sion that failures are due to progressive cycle-by-cycle deformation, 
or "ratcheting" (Hannum et a1., 1979). 
Regenerative Cooling Techniques 
A parametric study has been carried out that defines the regenera-
tive* cooling required to give two types of motors (the L02/LH2 gas 
generator type and staged-combustion type) a life of 250 missions over 
a 20,000-600,000-lb thrust range (Cook, 1979). Maximum chamber pres-
sures were determined for three hydrocarbon propellants (RP-l, methane, 
and propane) with various types of cooling: (a) regenerative cooling 
alone and (b) regenerative cooling in conjunction with the use of ther-
mal barriers on the combustion chamber walls (carbon layers, ceramic 
coatings, and graphite liners), (c) other types of cooling (film** 
cooling and transpiration*** cooling), innovative combustion techniques 
(zoned combustion****), or (d) combinations of these. 
* 
** 
Cooling of the combustion chamber wall by passing one of the 
propellants through the cooling jacket or cooling tubes prior to 
its injection into the chamber. 
Introduction of a relatively small amount of a propellant through 
holes in the combustion chamber wall upstream of the area to be 
cooled such that it flows over the surface in a thin film. 
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The study showed that the L02/methanepropellant combination 
enabled the highest chamber pressures. For the L02/RP-l combination 
to be compe.titive, it was necessasry to use a carbon layer and a 
liqui.d-gas injection design because of the low decomposition tempera-
ture of RP-l. 
Combinations were found to g:ive the best results; combinations of 
carbon layers and ceramic coatings for L02/RP-l combustors and combi-
nations of ceramic coatings and film cooling for L02/methane and 
L02/propane. 
Tram~piration Cooling Techniques 
Transpiration techniques (Aero jet , 1979b) make it possible to cool 
crit:tca1 regions of a combustion chamber effectively but a broader 
technology base needs to be developed. There are problems with (a) 
fabr:tcation" (b) the achievement of the low flow rates required, and 
(c) the achievement of flow distributions that will give uniform wall 
temperatures. 
Gains are being made, however. New e1ectroforming, photo-etching, 
diffusion bonding, and e1ectron-'beam welding techniques are enabling 
fabr:l.cation of the components required. t-iateria1s with more uniform 
porosity (e .. g., "discrete porous media") are now available and improved 
analytical models for such materials have been developed. 
It is essential that the amount of propellant used for transpira-
tion cooling be a minimum since it degrades the performance of a motor. 
One way of accomplishing this is by using transpiration cooling only 
in the reglons where it is necE~ssary and using regenerative cooling 
elsewhere. Aerojet (1979b) designed an experimental L02/LH2 motor 
that was cooled this way, using photo-etched copper plates for the 
transpiration cooling and hydrogen as the coolant. Tests on this motor 
prov:Lded information that can be used for the future design of reusable 
high'-pressure (3,000-5,000 psi) roeket motors. 
Nozzle Aerodynamics 
Full·advantage has not been taken of unconventional nozzle designs 
and their potential for improvE!ments in the performance, life, and 
design of liquid-propelled rockets. For example, the use of a cluster 
of combustors around a contoured plug instead of one large combustor 
would make it possible to increase the expansion ratio of a nozzle for 
a glven nozzle length or, conversely, shorten the nozzle length for a 
given expansion ratio. The first option (a higher expansion ratio), 
an example of which is seen in Figure 13 would lmprove the performance 
*** Introduction of a relatively small amount of the propellant 
through a porous section built into the chamber at or slightly 
upstream of the area that needs to be cooled. 
****The introduction of an excessive proportion of one of the propel-
lants (usually the oxidizE!r) through injector holes near the 
chamber wall, resulting in lower combustion temperatures in this 
region .. 
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for a given chamber pressure or make it possible to increase the 
performance by going to higher chamber pressures. There are 
trade-offs, of course. Higher pressures cause more severe heat 
transfer problems and affect the life of a motor and clustering adds 
to performance and weight problems (Aerojet, 1979c) but a plug cluster 
engine could be competitive with an uprated RL-IO or the advanced 
high-performance motor discussed earlier in this report. 
Other unconventional nozzles (e.g., the dual-throat and dual-
expander nozzles shown in Figure 14) also need to be evaluated and 
considered for use where they have particular advantages. 
Low-Gravity Cryogenic Fluid Management 
The storage and handling of cryogenic propellants under the virtu-
ally weightless (low-acceleration) conditions that occur in some mis-
sions poses some difficulties. The in-orbit refueling of future space 
vehicles is one of the problems that has been given some attention 
(Cady and Miyashiro, 1978; Merion et al., 1978; Merino et al., 1980). 
The most important of the storage and handling problems are (a) the 
positioning of the cryogenic liquids in the tanks during low-accelera-
tion firing and refueling, (b) the transfer from supply to receiving 
tanks during low-acceleration flight, (c) long-term storage, and (d) 
flow instabilities in the piping between the tanks and the combustion 
chamber during starts. 
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To fill a tank with a liquid, there must be a continuous liquid-
vapor interface (no vapor bubbles or pockets) and the liquid must not 
interfere with the venting of the vapor. The liquid can be settled and 
positioned, as required, by low-level accelerations that are either 
sustained or intermittent. During the firing of the rocket engine(s), 
the tank contents must be positioned so that there is always liquid 
over the outlet. 
Long-term cryogenic storage requirements for future missions indi-
cate the need for more heat transfer research, more information on 
reusable insulation performance, and the development of design criteria 
for light-weight low-cost Dewar shells. 
To reduce flow instabilities in transfer lines, it is also neces-
sary to know more about the thermodynamics, heat transfer, and fluid 
dynamics of transient two-phase flow. Some work has already been done 
in this area (Cady, 1973). 
To obtain the information described above, an in-space experimental 
program has been proposed (NASA, 1979; Bradshaw and King, 1977). 
Component and System Life, Reliability, and Maintenance 
The committee examined three categories of interest in this area: 
(a) combustor wall failures 
(b) combustor life prediction techniques, and 
(c) non-destructive evaluation tools 
Combustor Wall Failures 
To determine the effect of the wall temperature on the life of a 
combustor and to obtain a better understanding of the failure mechan-
ism, NASA ran tests on 21 cylindrical sections (three different 
materials), cycling them to failure (Quentmeyer, 1977). All of the 
failures were characterized by a thinning of the cooling channel wall 
and, finally, tensile rupture. 
The cycles-to-failure data correlated with the surface temperature 
of the wall and the temperature difference across the wall but the 
results obtained did not agree with the results obtained from uniaxial 
isothermal tests. 
Preliminary analytical studies (Kasper and Notardenato, 1979) have 
indicated that thin copper closeouts with low-stiffness overwraps (See 
Figure 15) can improve the cyclic life of regeneratively cooled milled-
channel combustors, since they would constrict the thermal expansion 
of the liner to a lesser extent during the firing cycle. This was 
confirmed by tests on three combustors. 
Combustor Life Prediction Techniques 
NASA has developed a simple technique for estimating the life of a 
regeneratively cooled combustor (Kasper, 1977). Making use of the 
combustion gas temperature and the temperature difference between the 
hot surface of the wall and outside surface of the closeout, the tech-
nique enables a quick estimate of the effect that design changes or 
test-cycle variations will have on combustor life. The paper by Kasper 
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FIGURE 15 Regeneratively Cooled Low-Stiffness Thrust Chamber Closeout 
graphically presents the strain range and life expectancy for a typical 
high-performance combustor with a half-hard zirconium-copper liner and 
an electroformed nickel closeout. 
Although life predictions for regeneratively cooled combustors are 
normally derived from classical fatigue principles, the failures 
observed in experimental tests do not appear to be due entirely to 
fatigue. Instead, the bulging and thinning of the wall progresses with 
each firing until it finally fails. 
A preliminary analysis of a cylindrical oxygen-free high-conduc-
tivity copper combustor by Vos and Armstrong (1977) has shown that the 
thinning of the combustor wall can be predicted by taking into account 
the cumulative plastic effects. Subsequent work by Armstrong (1979) 
includes the effect of the properties of the material in the analysis. 
A study has also been made of the thermomechanical behavior and 
fatigue l:tfe of various plug-nozzle configurations (Armstrong and 
Brogren, 1975). 
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Non-Destructive Evaluation Tools 
NASA has developed an eddy-current probe technique for determining 
the remaining life expectancy of a motor (Johnson, 1978) that is now 
being evaluated. 
Assessment of NASA's Fundamental Technology Program 
NASA's approach to providing solutions to fundamental problems is 
not adequate. The present approach is what one might expect for an 
advanced design and development program, appropriate for the solution 
of specific immediate problems but not for a better understanding of 
the complex phenomena involved and an enlargement of the body of fun-
damental knowledge. What is needed is a more basic conceptual approach 
that can lead to new and innovative solutions of future, as well as 
current, problems. 
The general procedure at the present time is for NASA to give con-
tracts that cover specific problems to one or two aerospace firms 
(usually engine developers) who usually try to find solutions by ex-
trapolating designs or analyses that have resulted from the solution 
of previous problems. The solutions are often limited by the materials 
and configurations used in the past, or lead to rather complicated 
designs that are difficult and costly to fabricate. The contracts 
usually result in hardware rather than generalized concepts that 
enlarge the fundamnta1 technology base. The end-result is less than 
adequate for this nation's long-range goals. 
A new approach is needed. As is evident from the bibliography and 
the citations in this report, the bulk of the work in liquid rocket 
propulsion has been done by the rocket engine companies or other aero-
space companies. Instead of contracting its fundamental technology work 
to the aerospace industry, NASA should expand the fundamental research 
being done at its Lewis Research Center and, in addition, involve a 
broader community of engineers and scientists in its program. Work-
shops and seminars should be held to identify the problems and needs 
of the space program, with encouragement and support for directed 
research given to those whose ideas and knowledge appear useful. 
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LIQUID ROCKET PROPULSION FOR DOD PROGRAMS 
Mili.tary interest in large and medium-sized liquid rocket motors is now 
limited to their use for the launching of satellites for communication, 
navi.gation, reconnaissance, surveillance, and other purposes and, pos-
sibly, theJtr use in the "advan(:ed military vehicle" described below. 
Liquid rocket motors are no longer being produced for the launching of 
missiles because it is much easier to handle, store, and utilize solid 
propellants. These advantages make solid propellants the better choice 
for missiles that must be ready for immediate use, but not the better 
choice for the launching of satellites where payload/weight ratios are 
more important than a.readiness capability. 
Although solid propellants are now the main source of propulsion 
for missilE!s, small liquid thrusters are still used for maneuvering and 
guidance where it is necessary to have a start-stop capability and, if 
need be, vary the thrust. The propellants used for such thrusters are 
usually non-cryogenic liquids ~ either N204/monomethylhydrazine or 
the monopropellant hydrazine. 
The committee was not chargE~d with the task of studying and evalu-
ating the liquid rocket activities of the armed services but considered 
it necessary to review the scope and general content of the DOD program 
to understand how they relate to and depend upon the activities of 
NASA. 
Military Mission Model 
As ind:lcated in the MISSION MODEL section of this report, DOD* will 
use the Space Shuttle and its derivatives as the primary vehicle for 
earth-to-orbit satellite launchings during the foreseeable future. 
Until the Space Shuttle becomes fully operational, the Air Force will 
continue to use its Atlas-based and Titan-based vehicles and, as of 
July 1980~ had 45 such launchings planned for the 1981-85 period. 
*Th~e Air Force has the repsonsibility for the military space program. 
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Launch Vehicles for Military Space Missions 
As of now, DOD is relying on NASA for the development and upgrading 
of the Space Shuttle. DOD is interested in follow-on development of 
motors for intermediate and heavy-lift launch vehicles. The department 
has no program of its own for the development of large liquid-fueled 
rocket motors. DOD is anticipating working with NASA for the develop-
ment of high-thrust and low-thrust orbital transfer vehicles. 
DOD is interested in the single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicle con-
cept NASA is studying but for a different set of reasons. While NASA 
is interested in a more-or-less completely reusable vehicle with low 
fabrication and operating costs, DOD is interested in having a hori-
zontaltake-off vehicle that can be kept on alert for emergencies and 
specific military tasks, fully loaded with cryogenic propellants. For 
DOD, readiness and short turnaround times are the most important con-
siderations,with the optimization of cost and payload secondary. 
During the past few years, the Air Force has carried out a number 
of studies on SSTO components for what it calls an "Advance Military 
Vehicle." Studies have been made of (a) ways of upgrading the Space 
Shuttle main engine for this task, (b) ways of increasing combustion 
efficiencies, (c) nozzle configurations, (d) high temperature turbines 
for turbopumps and (e) tank designs. During the next few years, it is 
planned to undertake studies of (a) alternate engine concepts, (b) pump 
bearings and seals, (c) light weight engine components, (d) feed sys-
tems, (e) ways of storing cryogenic propellants for long periods of 
time and to seek funding for component development and demonstration 
programs. 
DOD and NASA coordinate their activities through the Joint Army, 
Navy, NASA, Air Force Interagency Propulsion Committee (JANNAF). 
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INDUSTRY CAPABILITY 
Figures 16 and 17 tell the story of industrial activity in liquid 
rocket propulsion in the United States. Referring to Figure 16, the 
acti"ITity began in the 1940s with a relatively low research and tech-
nology development effort sponsored by government agencies, increased 
gradually into the early 1950s, and then, in the mid 1950s, increased 
rapidly as development work was lnitiated on missiles for the armed 
forces. By 1964, funding for liquid rocket propulsion was up to $1,700 
million per year and the aerospace industry was thriving. As illus-
trated in Figure 17, work on the Atlas, Thor, and Jupiter missiles 
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began in 1954. The Titan program started the following year, and the 
development of the Agena rocket was underway a year later. Before the 
decade was out, a start had also been made on the H-l, J-2, and F-l, 
the large liquid rocket motors that were to lead to the development of 
the Saturn vehicles for the manned Apollo moon shots. 
The turning point came when DOD began to shift its interest from 
liquid to solid-fuel rockets. Solid propellants eliminated the prob-
lems associated with the long-term storage of cryogenic liquid propel-
lants in missiles that had to be ready for launch at a moment's notice 
and also simplified the operation and maintenance of a strategic and 
tactical missile force. The performance characteristics of solid 
rocket motors were not as good as those of liquid rocket motors, 
requiring the use of heavier vehicles, but the solid-propelled missiles 
were, on balance, the best choice for the task. Liquid-fueled rockets 
continued to be used for the launching of satellites (both civil and 
military), the Apollo program, and planetary spacecraft but they repre-
sented a lesser part of the total expenditure. As the Atlas and Titan 
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miss:\.le programs were phased down, the liquid rocket sector of the 
aerospace industry began to decHne and dropped off rapidly as the 
Apollo program came to an end and budget cuts reduced the size of the 
civil space effort. By 1970, thc~ aerospace industry's level of activ-
ity in liquid rocket propulsion was down to $400 million per year and 
by 1980 it was little more than .H was when it all began in 1954, less 
than $250 million per year. Work on large engines came to a virtual 
halt, except for the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) and some produc-
tion of the Titan, Transtage, Agena and RL-IO. 
During the 1970-79 period, the specialized personnel involved in 
engineering, management, procurement, manufacturing, test, and quality 
control in the liquid propulsion sector of the aerospace industry 
dropped from 8,600 to less than half that number.* 
The low level of Titan production will come to an end in 1983 
although a few may be produced for the launching of DOD satellites 
until the Space Shuttle becomes fully operational. Aerojet will be out 
of the large liquid rocket bus1.ness when Titan production ends. At 
that point, Rocketdyne, with its responsibility for the SSME and its 
uprated versions, will be the only company left with an organization 
and facilities for the development and production of large liquid 
rocket engines. 
If NASA and DOD programs continue on their present course, Rocket-
dyne will also be the only company left with the capability of develop-
ing and producing medium-thrust l:lquid rocket motors that can be used 
in upper-stage vehicles. With the production of the Agena rocket at 
an .Emd, Bell Aerospace is no longer active in this area. Production 
of the RL·-lO is scheduled to end and Pratt & Whitney, with no other 
contracts for work on motors of this type and size, will be out of 
field in 1981.** Aerojet will end its activity in this area in 1983. 
The major aerospace companies have indicated it will take contracts 
totaling $10-20 million per year to keep intact the basic 200-person 
(crHical mass) organization required to maintain an adequate level of 
competence in the large and med:lum liquid rocket propulsion field. *** 
The funding NASA is now seeking for R&T on liquid rocket propulsion 
systems during the next decade would support the liquid rocket develop-
ment capab:l1ities of one company for a period of about seven years, 
-*-'Paper presented at April 29-30, 1980 meeting by 
U.S. Air Force Rocket Propulsion Laboratory, 
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the 
Council, Washington, D.C. 
representative of 
on file at the 
National Research 
** Subsequent to this review, on Jan. 15, 1981, NASA announced its 
intention to terminate its support of the 3-stage inertial upper 
stage (IUS-3) for the Shuttle to launch the Galileo orbiter and 
probe missions to Jupiter and to use a modified Centaur vehicle 
with its RL-IO engine instead, thus creating a need for some 
continued RL-IO production. 
*** Unpublished survey by NASA. 
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since 30 percent or so of this funding would be used for work carried 
out in NASA laboratories. The capabilities of the one company would 
be maintained in R&D, but an engineering and production capability 
would not be maintained. 
The committee views with concern the loss of development capability 
over the next few years as most of the major aerospace companies phase 
out their work on large and medium-sized liquid rocket motors. The 
team of skilled and experienced scientists, engineers, and technicians 
that ·have been brought together over the years, once dismantled and 
dispersed, cannot be reassembled. While the committee views with con-
cern a potential loss of competitive industrial capability in large 
liquid booster rocket engines, it should be clearly understood that it 
does not propose or recommend the artificial maintenance of a contrac-
tor's capability in the absence of a real need for his product. For 
funding gaps longer than a few months, support of this kind is very 
unlikely to retain a competent capability or otherwise prove worth-
while. Further, the committee holds that support of a competing con-
tractor through Research and Technology funding alone is impractical, 
partly because of the magnitude of the funding required and partly 
because R&T funding will not retain first quality engineering and pro-
duction facilities and personnel of the kind needed actually to be 
"competitive." 
The recommendations of the committee affecting industrial survival, 
therefore, are 1imite·d to: (1) activities and funding which will sup-
port immediate commencement of work to upgrade the RL-10 and adapt it 
as an orbital transfer vehicle (see section on ORBITAL TRANSFER VEHI-
CLES); and (2) technology development work making it possible to uprate 
the earth-to-orbit shuttle (see section on EARTH-TO-ORBIT VEHICLES). 
Implementation of the program recommended in this report can pro-
ductively sustain two contractors in the liquid-fueled rocket field, 
although their capability will not be directly competitive in very 
large boosters. 
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